IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
JAMESGARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZONED_JJ, in his official and individual
capacities,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-0853
MOTION TO STRIKE
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff JamesGardai, proceeding in pro per, hereby submits this motion to strike
Defendant Zoned_JJ’s affirmative defense under the Department Cooperation Act (“the Act”).1
ARGUMENT
I. THE DEPARTMENT COOPERATION ACT DOES NOT CREATE A CIVIL
DEFENSE
Defendant’s “affirmative defense” fails at the threshold because the Act does not provide
civil immunity or any other doctrine that defeats civil liability. At most, the Act regulates
internal arrest procedures among agencies and sets out criminal penalties for officers; it does not
state that compliance with the Act bars civil claims, nor does it create any privilege or immunity
from civil suit. Because the Act does not supply a defense that would defeat liability even if
Plaintiff’s allegations are assumed true, Defendant’s reliance on the Act is legally immaterial
and insufficient as a matter of law. Accordingly, the asserted “affirmative defense” should be
stricken.
II. THE COURT MAY STRIKE AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE THAT IS LEGALLY
INSUFFICIENT
First, as a starting point, an unconstitutional law “is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as
inoperative as though it had never been passed.” Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886);
1 First, the Court should strike the affirmative defense because the Act does not create a civil defense from
liability. Second, in any case where the Court disagrees that the Act does not create a civil defense, it should still
strike the affirmative defense because the Act is unconstitutional.
see also Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (“An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no
law.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (“Certainly all those who have
framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law
of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the
legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.) (emphasis added).
Second, “because of the practical difficulty of deciding cases without a factual record it
is well established that the action of striking a pleading should be sparingly used by the courts. It
is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice.” Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953) (internal citations
omitted). Thus, such a motion should only be granted “when the pleading to be stricken has no
possible relation to the controversy.” Id. And “[w]ith respect to affirmative defenses, a motion is
strike is proper if the defense is insufficient; that is, if ‘as a matter of law, the defense cannot
succeed under any circumstances.’” United States v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 218 F.
Supp. 2d 931, 936 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (quoting Ameriwood Industries Int'l Corp. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 961 F. Supp. 1078, 1083 (W.D.Mich.1997)).”
III. THE DEPARTMENT COOPERATION ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Defendant claims a single affirmative defense. That is, specifically, under §(4)(v) of the
Department Cooperation Act, S8-18. It provides that an “on-duty law enforcement officer shall
have the authority to arrest, cite, or detain another on-duty law enforcement officer” when the
officer being arrested is acting in a rogue capacity and possesses an immediate threat to public
safety, or is actively committing an offense that possesses a severe threat to life, and there is no
reasonable opportunity to seek agency consent without compromising public safety or the
integrity of the response.” Id.
The Act is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, the act is impermissibly void,
encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement; second, it places public officials in a
higher class, protecting them from arrest, thereby offending the Equal Protection Clause.
A. The Act is Unconstitutional Because It Is Void for Vagueness
“Laws” must “give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972). Indeed, “if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must
provide explicit standards for those who apply them.” Id. A statute is void for vagueness when it
“fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute.” Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)
This principle applies whenever a statute regulates conduct under threat of legal
consequences, and is especially important where the statute authorizes criminal penalties or
enforcement discretion.2 The Department Cooperation Act imposes criminal liability while
employing undefined and subjective terms such as “rogue capacity,” “severe threat,” “reasonable
opportunity,” and requirements for undefined “command approval.” Indeed, “[v]ague laws invite
arbitrary power…leaving people in the dark about what the law demands and allowing
prosecutors and courts to make it up.” Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. ___ (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). These provisions fail to provide clear standards governing when an officer may
lawfully act and leave critical decisions to ad hoc judgment.
B. The Act Offends the Equal Protection Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The Equal
Protection Clause demands that those “similarly situated” receive equal protection under law.
See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
The Department Cooperation Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by treating law enforcement officers and civil service employees differently based
solely on their department affiliation, without any rational or state interest justifying such
2 Although several of the cited cases arise in criminal contexts, the void for vagueness doctrine is a
principle of due process that applies in civil proceedings as well. The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he
degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates… depends in part on the nature of the enactment,” and that the
doctrine applies whenever a law regulates conduct and imposes legal consequences. Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). When a Court is confronted with an unconstitutional
statute, it must do its duty “to say what the law is,” Marbury, supra, no matter what the context is. But also, because
the Act regulates official conduct and imposes criminal penalties, the heightened vagueness standard is
appropriately considered here twofold.
classifications. The Act prohibits on-duty law enforcement officers from arresting, citing, or
detaining other law enforcement officers except under narrow, enumerated circumstances
requiring supervisory consent, intra-agency approval, or direct orders from the Attorney
General’s Office, arbitrarily restricting the authority of certain officers to enforce the law against
other officers, creating a protected class exempt from ordinary law enforcement scrutiny unless
pre-approved. Meanwhile, ordinary civilians or other public employees not subject to the
provisions of the Act are subject to immediate law enforcement actions without such hurdles.
Likewise, the Act grants civil service employees a special status exempting them from arrest,
citation, or detention except under additional restrictions such as requiring higher-level
supervisory consent. These exemptions shield certain government officials from equal
accountability and undermine the principle that no one is above the law. The Act draws arbitrary
distinctions between similarly situated individuals—government officials and ordinary
civilians–by exempting the former from arrest or citation unless burdensome internal procedures
are followed. No rational or compelling state interest justifies this classification.
The result is a two-tiered system of enforcement: ordinary civilians may be arrested upon
probable cause, while government employees are protected from accountability unless
procedural barriers are first overcome. This violates the principle of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. For example, under the Act, a civilian may be immediately arrested by
an officer for assaulting someone in public. But if a civil service employee or another officer
commits the same act, a law enforcement officer cannot arrest them without prior agency
approval—creating an unjustified disparity in enforcement capacity.
“[T]he equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.” Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). If a law is applied “with an evil eye and an unequal hand”
it violates equal protection. Id., at 373, and when legislation is passed that conflicts with the
federal constitution, “federal law prevails” Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 190
(1979), and state legislation “may not contravene federal law.” Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S.
529, 22 (2013).
CONCLUSION
“No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set
that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the
lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.” United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,
220 (1882)
For the foregoing reasons, the motion should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: 02/24/2026
/s/ JAMESGARDAI
Newfounding Father
HOUSE OF GARDAI3
Rid. Bar. No. 10244
Gardai Island
United States Virgin Islands
D; fishfromocean
Counsel of Record
3 An unincorporated association.
