RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
ROBERTSEVIGNE
,
Plaintiff, pro-se
v.
RIDGEWAY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
,
Defendant
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-0813
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
INTRODUCTION
In this case, ridgeway department of transportation ‘RDOT” has wrongfully sought the dismissal of the
plaintiff’s complaint by characterizing an alleged constitutional deprivation as an ‘inconvenience’. This
reasoning is incorrect. The defendant in this case has put forth evidence that demonstrates the
constitutional deprivation of failing to publish or provide a means of obtaining a handicap access permit
has the ability to diminish or eliminate a person’s ability to gain ‘vital access’ to the use of their vehicles
during their everyday activities. This reality triggers constitutional concerns as per the guarantees of life,
liberty, and property as espoused in Rid. Const. art. I, § 5.
In this case, the defendant has alleged the plausibility of the claim while the burden is on the plaintiff in
this case to provide the evidence supporting the claim. At this level of adjudication, the court is bound
by the anchors of incredibility and is bound to assume all as true that is put forth in the plaintiff’s
complaint and all assumptions in the reasoning that is put forth must be in favour of the plaintiff’s case.
In the words of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 ‘inferences’ must be favouring the ‘IVA plaintiff’.
A claim can only be dismissed on the grounds that the claim factually lacks in the allegations needed to
support the claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
In this case, the plaintiff has put forth evidence supporting the idea or the example of the case being
plausible and able to be sustained due to the allegations/claims/assumptions put forth in the case. This
means that in regard to the case at hand, which is the defendant's claim for dismissal, the dismissal cannot
be granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil procedure, there can only a dismissal when
the complaint does not claim facts of a sufficient nature to support a legally plausible claim. Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The court is required to accept the claims as true and
give them the most liberal interpretation possible in favour of the non-moving party. Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiff Adequately States a Claim Under Rid. Const. art. I, § 5.
Defendant is incorrect when he states that Plaintiff is only alleging “inconvenience.” Plaintiff was filing a
Freedom of Information request and was given no way to apply for a handicap permit. This denial
constituted withholding a benefit that is essential for mobility and for accessing one’s own property, in
this case a vehicle.
The denial of access to certain benefits or programs that may be critical for exercising one’s liberty is life
interest, has been recognized as constitutional violations. In Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34
(2004), the Supreme Court pointed out the failure to provide access even to basic public facilities for a
class of citizens with disabilities, amounted to violation of the most fundamental constitutional
provisions. Also, in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), the Court noted that property
interests do not originate from the Constitution, but from “rules or understandings” which grant certain
benefits. Such a recognized benefit is a handicap permit.
Defendant cites DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), to argue
that the Constitution imposes no affirmative duty. But unlike DeShaney, this case involves Plaintiff’s
affirmative effort to engage a government program for which Defendant is the sole gatekeeper. By
application, Defendant has completely withheld access to a constitutionally guaranteed benefit.
II. Plaintiff Has Alleged Concrete and Particularized Harm.
Defendant claims Plaintiff has not demonstrated an injury-in-fact as per Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). This is a fundamental misunderstanding of the record. Plaintiff claims:
⦁ He applied for a handicap permit.
⦁ Defendant provided no means for him to apply.
⦁ Consequently, he was unable to obtain the permit.
⦁ This limited his ability to use the vehicle, negatively impacting his overall quality of life.
These claims are, not mere assumptions, rather, clear and well-defined. Courts have reiterated, and
proposed, the denial of access to a government benefit or service is an injury by itself. See Lane, 541
U.S. at 533; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). (Students had a property interest in the education
offered to them that was protected by due process).
III. Plaintiff’s Request for Punitive Damages Does Not Warrant Dismissal of the Entire Complaint.
Defendant correctly notes that punitive damages are generally unavailable against governmental entities
absent statutory authorization. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
However, the unavailability of one form of damages does not justify dismissal of the entire action.
Courts routinely strike or limit remedies while allowing the underlying claims to proceed. See Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1978) (recognising nominal and compensatory damages for
constitutional violations even where punitive damages may not apply).
At most, Defendant’s argument affects only the scope of potential remedies, not the viability of
Plaintiff’s constitutional claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss in its entirety, or, in the alternative, deny the motion as to Plaintiff’s constitutional claim and
strike only the punitive damages demand.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: September 12, 2025
RobertSevigne
I’m a big black nigga
