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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
RIDGEWAY
RobertSevigne,
Plaintiff,
v,
Ridgeway Department of Transportation,
Defendant.
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MOTION TO DISMISS
Hon. MatthewSandringham
Docket Number: RSC-CV-0813
Defendant Ridgeway Department of Transportation (“RDOT”), by and through the Office
of the Attorney General, respectfully moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its
entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure. A memorandum of
law in support of the motion to dismiss is attached hereto.
Date: 12th September 2025
Respectfully submitted,
/s/
Tobyrulles4568
Counsel of Record
Attorney General
Department of Justice
E: [email protected]
D: Toby
Annex Building, Palmer
State of Ridgeway
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
RIDGEWAY
RobertSevigne,
Plaintiff,
v,
Ridgeway Department of Transportation,
Defendant.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
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MOTION TO DISMISS
Hon. MatthewSandringham
Docket Number: RSC-CV-0813
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff RobertSevigine attempts to frame an alleged failure to provide informational
guidance on a handicap permit application as a violation of the Ridgeway Constitution, seeking
compensatory and punitive damages. But even read in the light most favourable to Plaintiff, the
Complaint does not articulate any cognisable constitutional violation. At most, it alleges
inconvenience.
Courts consistently hold that a constitutional claim requires more than conclusory
assertions or administrative frustrations. Further, Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages
against a state agency is squarely foreclosed as a matter of law. According, dismissal is not only
appropriate but compelled.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This mirrors the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulation in Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Towmbly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); a plaintiff
must plead factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable. Naked assertions devoid of factual enhancement cannot survive dismissal.
ARGUMENTS
I. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under the Ridgeway Constitution
Plaintiff alleges that the Department’s omission in publishing or providing information on
how to apply for a handicap permit violated Rid. Const. Art. I § 5, which protects “life, liberty,
and property.” But Plaintiff pleads no facts demonstrating that his life, liberty or property was
actually deprived.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that not every government action (or inaction)
rises to the level of a constitutional violation. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989), the Court explained that the Due Process Clause does not
impose a duty on the State to protect individuals from every harm. Similarly, the Ridgeway
Constitution cannot be stretched to impose a free-floating obligation on agencies to ensure
informational perfection.
Courts reject claims based on speculative or generalised grievances. See Lujan v.
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Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (requiring injury-in-fact that is concrete,
particularised, and actual). Plaintiff alleges only that he submitted a Freedom of Information
request and “did not receive such information.” That is an inconvenience, not a deprivation of a
constitutional right. Without showing that he was denied a permit, lost the use of his vehicle, or
suffered a specific restriction on liberty or property, Plaintiff cannot plausibly plead a
constitutional violation.
Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts that, if true, would constitute a deprivation under
id. Const. art. I, § 5, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II. Plaintiff’s Demands for Punitive Damages Are Barred as a Matter of Law
Even if Plaintiff had alleged a viable claim (which he has not), his request for punitive
damages must be dismissed independently.
It is black-letter law that punitive damages may not be awarded against a governmental
department or agency absent express statutory authorisation. The U.S. Supreme Court has made
this principle clear: “[A] municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.” City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Ridgeway courts adopt
the same reasoning when applying constitutional provisions to state entities.
Courts routinely dismiss punitive damage claims sua sponte when directed against
immune entities. See also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.13 (1985) (“[Punitive
damages] are not available under § 1983 from a municipality.”). By analogy, RDOT is equally
shielded here.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should dismiss with prejudice the Plaintiff’s
Complaint that fails to allege facts sufficient to state a constitutional violation under Rid. Const.
art. I, § 5; and Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages, which are legally barred against a state
agency.
Date: 12th September 2025
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/
Tobyrulles4568
Counsel of Record
Attorney General
Department of Justice
E: [email protected]
D: Toby
Annex Building, Palmer
State of Ridgeway
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