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28 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RIDGEWAY RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(A)(5) - 1
0xSyns
4000 Majellan Way, Sterling Heights
D: notsinz
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
BATTALIONGAVIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RIDGEWAY TIMES INC., AND JULIARWILSON,
Defendant
Case No.: RSC-CV-2482
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO
RIDGEWAY RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
12(A)(5)
Defendants Ridgeway Times Inc. and JuliaRWilson ("Defendants"), by and through undersigned counsel,
respectfully move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Ridgeway Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(a)(5) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Complaint fails as a
matter of law because (1) the claims are barred by the First Amendment’s protections for reporting on
newsworthy events, (2) Plaintiff, a public official, has failed to plausibly plead the required element of
actual malice, and (3) the injunctive relief sought constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Ridgeway Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." To meet this standard, a complaint must contain
"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is
plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.
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28 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RIDGEWAY RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(A)(5) - 2
ARGUMENT
I. Count I (Misappropriation) Must Be Dismissed Under the Newsworthiness Doctrine..
Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that Defendants are liable for Misappropriation of Name or
Likeness because they used videos of him to "incentivize viewership and growth of their audience". This
claim is barred by the well-established newsworthiness exception.
The tort of appropriation is meant to prevent the unauthorized use of a person's identity for
commercial exploitation. It does not apply to the reporting of news. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it
clear that constitutional protections for speech and press limit the reach of state privacy laws when the
publication involves matters of public interest. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967), the Court
held that the First Amendment protects the reporting of "newsworthy" information. The "benefit" a news
organization receives from increased viewership is incidental to its primary, constitutionally protected
function of informing the public about matters of public concern. Using a person's name or likeness in
this newsworthy context is not the kind of commercial appropriation the tort was designed to prevent.
Here, the subject matter of the articles—the on-duty conduct of a police officer, including allegations
of "unprofessional conduct" and "racism"—is unequivocally a matter of public interest. The Complaint
itself concedes that the videos depicted Plaintiff engaged in his official duties during an "altercation
between Plaintiff and a suspect". The fitness and conduct of law enforcement officers is a prime example
of a newsworthy topic. Because Defendants’ use of Plaintiff’s name and likeness was directly connected
to this newsworthy reporting, the claim for Misappropriation of Name or Likeness is not legally viable
and must be dismissed
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28 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RIDGEWAY RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(A)(5) - 3
II. Count II (False Light) Must Be Dismissed for Failure to Plausibly Allege Actual Malice.
Plaintiff's second claim, for False Light, fails because as a public official, he must plausibly allege
that Defendants acted with "actual malice," and his Complaint offers only conclusory allegations that do
not meet this high standard.
As a police officer, Plaintiff is a public official for the purposes of defamation and privacy torts.
See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Therefore, he must allege facts sufficient to plausibly show
that Defendants published the allegedly false statements with "actual malice"—that is, with knowledge
that the statements were false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts that would support a finding of actual malice. The
Complaint alleges that Defendants published articles containing "allegations of racism and misconduct"
based on "reports" they had received. The Complaint does not allege that these "reports" did not exist, nor
does it allege that Defendants knew these reports were false. Instead, it merely recites the legal standard,
stating "Defendants acted with reckless disregard for the truth".
This is precisely the type of "threadbare recital of the elements of a cause of action" that
the Supreme Court rejected in Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff offers no facts to show that Defendants had
"obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports." Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989). The fact that Plaintiff has a "spotless"
internal record is irrelevant to what Defendants knew at the time of publication. Without pleading
specific facts demonstrating that Defendants knowingly published falsehoods, the False Light claim
cannot proceed.
Respectfully submitted, /s/0xsyns
0xSyns
