RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
ALEXANDERLUTHORJR and
0XSYNS, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AB_BAE, in her official capacity as
the Secretary of State of the State of
Ridgeway,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-6925
MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant, by and through the Office of the Solicitor General, pursuant to
Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1) and 12(a)(5), respectfully moves the court to dismiss the
above-captioned matter because the plaintiffs lack standing and fail to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. A brief in support is attached.
Dated: August 9, 2025
Palmer, Ridgeway Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Nicklaus_s
Nicklaus_s (Bar No. 10421)
Counsel of Record
Deputy Solicitor General
Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Attorney for Defendant
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
ALEXANDERLUTHORJR and
0XSYNS, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AB_BAE, in her official capacity as
the Secretary of State of the State of
Ridgeway,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-6925
DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Rule 12(a)(1)
Rule 12(a)(1) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal
of an action for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1). A
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can attack the sufficiency of
the pleadings to establish jurisdiction—a facial attack—or a lack of any factual
support for subject matter jurisdiction despite the sufficiency of the pleading—a
factual attack. See Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 69 (1987).
The plaintiff bears the burden to establish that the court has jurisdiction, and the
court must assume that it does not. See Daimlerchrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
332, 342 (2006).
B. Rule 12(a)(6)
Rule 12(a)(6) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal
of an action for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rid. R.
Civ. P. 12(a)(6). When confronted with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, the court must “assume the veracity” of “well-pleaded allegations.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). However, the court, the court need not “accept
as true” allegations that offer merely “labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement.” Id. at 678. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
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content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
ARGUMENT
I. The court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs lack
standing.
This court is one of limited jurisdiction. It may only hear “cases” and
“controversies” arising under the laws and constitution. Rid. Const. art. 5, § 4. To
meet this constitutional requirement, a plaintiff must establish standing by alleging
that he has suffered, or will suffer, an injury that is “concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a
favorable ruling.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
a. The plaintiffs lack standing because they do not plausibly allege injuries-
in-fact.
Standing “is not dispensed in gross” but must be established “plaintiff-by-
plaintiff and claim-by-claim” through “allegations linking each plaintiff to each”
injury. Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 733 (1st Cir. 2016). At the
pleading stage, while “general factual allegations of injury resulting from the
defendant’s conduct may suffice,” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992), courts need not “accept as true” allegations that offer merely “labels and
conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
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In this matter, the plaintiffs have failed to establish an injury-in-fact and
therefore have no standing. They have not alleged what actual injuries or damages
they have suffered, but the complaint is instead chock-full of conclusions and naked
assertions. It relies on a laundry list of vague and speculative claims of injuries that
are identically attributed to each plaintiff and class member. Both plaintiffs allegedly
have “suffered financial harm,” and all putative class members purportedly
experienced “lost profits,” “lost income,” “lost opportunities,” and a generalized
“inability to enter the marketplace.” Complaint ¶¶ 3-4, 16, 21. But those allegations
fail to establish standing because “no specific information is provided regarding the
harm, if any, that has befallen each individual plaintiff.” Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at
732. The complaint does not allege what business activity each plaintiff wishes to
undertake, any information about their business application, how much income they
have lost, what opportunities they have lost, or how the short period of time that their
applications were being processed otherwise caused them identifiable loss. Instead,
the complaint makes only generalized, identical statements that each plaintiff and
class member has experienced some sort of harm. See Complaint ¶¶ 3-4 (“has
suffered financial harm.”); Id. ¶ 7 (“all members have been harmed.”); Id. ¶ 16 (“all
plaintiffs and class members” have experienced “concrete and ongoing financial
injury.”). But this is exactly what Hochendoner warns against. See Hochendoner,
823 F.3d at 733 (“…the plaintiffs say that they have…averred that Genzyme
produced a defective drug, the plaintiffs took that drug, and as a result they have
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sustained…enumerated specific harms. But this gloss on the complaints is
insupportable.”) (cleaned up).
In short, the complaint “offers only scattered descriptions of generalized
harm,” id. at 732, and alleges that each plaintiff has suffered some form of financial
harm at the hands of the defendant. But “conclusions” and “naked assertions devoid
of further factual enhancement…will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
b. To the extent the plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief and
retrospective declaratory relief, they lack standing because they do not
plausibly allege a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.
As pertinent here, the plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the defendant
violated the law by refraining from her official duties and a permanent injunction1
ordering the defendant to resume processing all pending and future business
applications in a timely fashion.
To the extent that the plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief—i.e., that
the defendant process all future applications in a timely fashion2—they must allege
that “there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). They do not do so here. In fact, they do not even
allege that they wish to file applications for business registration in the future. For
that reason, they lack standing to seek prospective injunctive relief.
1 To the extent that the plaintiffs seek a writ of mandamus, they have waived such a claim by failing to adequately
brief or argue a petition for writ of mandamus at all. See, e.g., DeVoss v. Southwest Airlines Co., 903 F.3d 487, 489
n.1 (explaining that the failure “to provide any structured argument supporting” a claim “in both the district court
and…on appeal” waives such a claim).
2 The language of the injunction sought is unclear. The defendant presumes that the plaintiffs actually intend for
the court to order the defendant to timely process future applications, not “resume” processing future applications. See
Complaint (“Issuing a permanent injunction…ordering Defendant…to immediately resume processing all pending
and future applications in a timely fashion.”)
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Their request for retrospective declaratory relief fares no better. Because a
declaratory judgment “would amount to nothing more than a declaration” that the
plaintiffs were “wronged” and “would have no effect” on the future behavior by
defendant, it is improper. Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 (10th Cir.
1997) (collecting cases). Indeed, to obtain declaratory relief, a plaintiff ordinarily
“must allege” more “than purely past injury.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA,
786 F.3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
II. The plaintiffs fail to state a claim for official misconduct.
1 R. Stat. § 3114 creates a cause of action against “any individual who is a
public servant and commits an act relating to his office but constitutes an
unauthorized exercise of his official functions, where a reasonable person with his
training, expertise, and experiences should know that such act is unauthorized; or
refrains from performing a duty which is imposed upon him by law or is clearly
inherent in the nature of his office.” 1 R. Stat. § 3114. To prevail on a claim of official
misconduct under state law then, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) a public
servant (a) commits an act relating to his office (1) but constitutes an unauthorized
exercise of his official functions (2) where a reasonable person with his expertise
should know that such act is unauthorized; or (b) refrains from performing a duty
(1) imposed upon him by law or (2) is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.
Here, the plaintiffs fail to sufficiently state a claim for official misconduct for
several reasons. First, to the extent they allege that the defendant performed an
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unauthorized exercise of her official functions, no unauthorized exercise could occur
because they allege that the defendant took no affirmative action. Second, they do
not allege that a reasonable person would know that such an act is unauthorized.
Third, to the extent that the plaintiffs allege that the defendant refrained from
performing a duty, they do not plausibly allege that a clearly inherent duty exists.
a. No unauthorized exercise could occur because the plaintiffs allege that
the defendant took no affirmative action.
In pertinent part, 1 R. Stat. § 3114 creates a cause of action against “any
individual who is a public servant and commits an act relating to his office but
constitutes an unauthorized exercise of his official functions.” Here, the plaintiffs do
not allege that the defendant committed any act, much less an unauthorized one. The
plaintiffs say as much themselves. See Complaint ¶ 20 (“This failure constitutes an
unauthorized exercise—or non-exercise—of her official functions”) (emphasis
added). Indeed, the crux of their complaint is instead that the defendant has “failed
to approve or deny any applications.” Complaint ¶ 13. However, Section 3114
necessarily requires that one take affirmative action. See 1 R. Stat. § 3114 (“commits
an act…but constitutes an unauthorized exercise of his official functions.”)
(emphasis added). For this reason, the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for
official misconduct.
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b. The plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that a reasonable person would
know such an act is unauthorized.
To be sure, the plaintiffs do not allege at all that a reasonable person would
know that such an act is unauthorized. Instead, they merely allege that the failure to
process applications by the defendant “constitutes an unauthorized exercise…of her
official functions.” Complaint ¶ 20. But this is merely a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of” official misconduct, which “will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
c. The plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that a clearly inherent duty exists.
Perhaps realizing this, the plaintiffs move to a different goal post. They allege
simply that the “timely processing of business applications” is a “clearly inherent”
duty, and the defendant “refrained from performing this duty” by “failing to process
any applications.” Complaint ¶¶ 18-19. But this theory fails for the same reasons as
the last. The plaintiffs do not explain how the duty to timely process business
applications is a duty “inherent in the nature” of the Department of State, much less
“clearly inherent.” 1 R. Stat. § 3114. In fact, the plaintiffs do not explain the nature
of the office held by the defendant at all. They have merely parroted the language of
the cause of action. But, as explained above, a “formulaic recitation of the elements
of” official misconduct “will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court shall dismiss the above-captioned matter.
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Dated: August 9, 2025
Palmer, Ridgeway Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Nicklaus_s
Nicklaus_s (Bar No. 10421)
Counsel of Record
Deputy Solicitor General
Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Attorney for Defendant
