JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY Countharebourg2, Plaintiff, v, Honoripedia; in his quasi-official capacity as Corporal in the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office, Defendant. MOTION TO DISMISS Hon. MatthewSandringham Docket Number: RSC-CV-9099 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Defendant, proceeding by and through the Attorney General of Ridgeway, hereby requests the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(5) because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. I. INTRODUCTION Defendant, Honoripedia, respectfully submits this Motion to Dismiss the civil complaint filed by Plaintiff, Chamomile_Pip a/k/a Countharebourg2, pursuant to the rules of civil procedure governing this Court, including but not limited to those analogous to Rule 12(a)(5). For the reasons set forth herein, the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support any of the asserted causes of action and must be dismissed in its entirety. Plaintiff’s claims are based on a single incident of arrest, which was executed under apparent statutory authority, and which does not give rise to liability under any of the theories pled. The allegations contained in the Complaint are conclusory, duplicative, and legally insufficient. II. LEGA STANDARD A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(5) is assessed under standards functionally analogous to those found in Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To survive such a motion, the plaintiff must plead sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The factual allegations must rise above the level of mere –1– speculation or legal conclusion and must permit the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plausibility standard is not a “probability requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. at 678. A complaint that tends to “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. Courts must disregard legal conclusions presented as factual allegations and assess only whether the well-pleaded factual content plausibly gives rise to a claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In applying this standard, the Court is required to construe the complaint in the light most favourable to the non-moving party and to accept as true all factual allegations contained therein. However, this deference does not extend to “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678. Where a complaint fails to plead factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference of liability or fails to allege any cognizable legal theory, dismissal is warranted. See also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (“[W]e are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”). Moreover, a complaint may also be dismissed where the alleged claims are inherently implausible, legally deficient, or conclusory in nature. Dismissal is appropriate not only when the facts alleged do not support the relief sought, but also when the relief itself is unsupported by any viable legal theory. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989) (courts may dismiss claims that are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or “factual contentions [that] are clearly baseless”). In this case, as set forth below, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to meet these established pleading requirements. The allegations are conclusory, unsupported by factual detail, and insufficient to demonstrate that any actionable misconduct occurred. Accordingly, dismissal under Rule 12(a)(5) is proper. III. THE BATTERY CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW Plaintiff alleges that Defendant committed battery in violation of 1 R. Stat. § 3102. However, the Complaint fails to allege any facts which, if true, would establish the essential elements of civil battery under Ridgeway law—namely, that Defendant intentionally caused –2– harmful or offensive physical contact without legal justification. The only conduct attributed to Defendant is that he approached, questioned, and arrested Plaintiff during an incident on July 24, 2025. The Complaint does not allege that Defendant struck, shoved, or applied force in any manner beyond what is ordinarily associated with a lawful arrest. There is no claim of injury, pain, or excessive or gratuitous contact. At most, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested—an act which, even if later vacated, does not itself constitute battery in the absence of unlawful or excessive force. It is well established that the Fourth Amendment allows law enforcement to use a degree of physical force that is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. As the United States Supreme Court has held, “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). A routine arrest involving ordinary contact, such as handcuffing or escorting a suspect to a patrol car does not meet the threshold for civil battery unless the force used was excessive, unjustified, or applied with malice. Moreover, it is well established that an officer executing a lawful arrest is permitted to use reasonable force, and such force does not give rise to civil liability absent a showing that it was excessive or unjustified. Plaintiff alleges no facts from which the Court could infer that Defendant exceeded the bounds of this legal privilege. Courts routinely reject battery claims arising from arrests where the plaintiff fails to plead facts demonstrating that the force used was more than reasonably necessary. See, e.g., Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding no battery where arrest involved only minimal, non-excessive contact). Instead, Plaintiff merely asserts the legal conclusion that the arrest constituted “battery,” without alleging facts that, if taken as true, would satisfy any element of the claim. Legal conclusions, unsupported by factual allegations, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant employed harmful or offensive physical contact outside the bounds of lawful force, the battery claim must be dismissed. –3– IV. THE OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT COUNTS ARE DUPLICATIVE, CONCLUSORY, AND UNSUPPORTED BY FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff asserts two causes of action for official misconduct under R.C.C. § 6.06 and 1 R. Stat. § 3114. Both claims arise from a single event: Defendant’s arrest of Plaintiff on July 24, 2025. These counts fail as a matter of law because they are duplicative, conclusory, and unsupported by any factual allegations that would give rise to civil liability. Under both cited statutes, official misconduct requires that a public officer (1) knowingly perform an unauthorised act relating to official duties, or (2) knowingly fail to perform a required duty. The Complaint does not allege that Defendant violated any specific legal command, nor does it identify any statutory provision that clearly prohibited the arrest in question. Instead, Plaintiff simply asserts in conclusory terms that the arrest was “unlawful,” without explaining how or why Defendant lacked legal authority. It is well-established that “[a] judge’s decision to later vacate a charge does not retroactively render the arrest unlawful.” See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (“The mere fact that the suspect is later acquitted or the charges dismissed does not mean that the arrest was unlawful at the time it was made.”). To the contrary, an officer acts lawfully so long as they act within the scope of their discretionary duties and do not violate a clearly established legal standard. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“Government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”). Here, the Complaint fails to plead that Defendant knowingly exceeded his lawful authority or willfully failed to carry out a legal duty. There is no allegation of malice, bad faith, or conscious disregard of the law. Nor is there any factual content from which the Court could infer that Defendant’s conduct was anything other than a good-faith execution of his perceived responsibilities as a law enforcement officer. As the Supreme Court made clear in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Because the Complaint contains only conclusory assertions and fails to allege any concrete factual basis establishing misconduct under either statute, these claims must be dismissed pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(5). –4– V. THE REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY DEFICIENT Plaintiff seeks both a temporary restraining order and permanent injunctive relief against Defendant. However, the Complaint fails to meet the minimum legal requirements for either form of relief. It describes a single, completed incident—an arrest that occurred on July 24, 2025—but pleads no ongoing conduct, no credible threat of future harm, and no basis to conclude that equitable relief is appropriate or necessary. As such, the request for injunctive relief is both procedurally improper and legally unsustainable. It is well-settled that injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy” that may only be granted upon a clear showing that: (1) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff’s favour; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. —Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Plaintiff satisfies none of these elements. The Complaint fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success, offers no plausible allegation of irreparable harm, and contains no facts showing that monetary relief would be inadequate. A past arrest—already completed and not alleged to be continuing—is not sufficient to justify injunctive relief. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief.”). Similarly, a plaintiff must establish a “real and immediate threat” of future injury—not a speculative or hypothetical risk. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974) (“Abstract injury is not enough. The plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury.”). The Complaint does not identify any continuing course of conduct by Defendant, nor does it allege any future interaction is likely or imminent. Further, courts consistently hold that when legal remedies—such as damages or expungement—are available to redress past harms, equitable relief is disfavored. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (“The basis for injunctive relief... has always been –5– irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies.”). Because Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based solely on a prior, isolated incident, without establishing any ongoing violation of law or continuing threat of harm, the request is both procedurally defective and substantively baseless. Accordingly, this Court should deny injunctive relief and dismiss that portion of the Complaint with prejudice. VI. THE DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IS UNFOUNDED AND UNSUPPORTED BY ANY ALLEGATION OF MALICIOUS CONDUCT Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages is legally defective and must be dismissed. The Complaint seeks a total of $8,500 in punitive damages—apparently calculated from the statutory maximums of the alleged violations—but provides no factual basis to justify such an award. As a matter of law, punitive damages are not awarded as a matter of course; they are reserved for instances of egregious misconduct involving malicious, intentional, or recklessly indifferent behaviour. The United States Supreme Court has held that “[p]unitive damages are awarded in the jury’s discretion to punish defendants for their willful or malicious conduct and to deter others from similar behavior.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983). To support a claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the defendant acted with “evil motive or intent” or “reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Id. at 56. Mere negligence or good-faith error in judgment does not meet this threshold. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999) (requiring proof of discriminatory intent or reckless indifference for Title VII punitive awards). The plaintiff pleads no such facts. The Complaint contains no allegation that Defendant acted with malice, spite, or a willful intent to violate Plaintiff’s rights. The only conduct at issue is a single arrest—executed in the course of Defendant’s law enforcement duties—which Plaintiff merely concludes was improper. There are no factual averments suggesting that Defendant acted vindictively, unlawfully, or with knowledge that his actions violated the law. Moreover, punitive damages cannot be awarded in the absence of a valid underlying cause of action. As the Court stated in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978), “the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury,” but punitive damages require more—namely, a showing of actual harm and culpable mental state. Whereas here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any compensable harm or actionable misconduct, –6– punitive relief is not available as a matter of law. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to support an award of punitive damages under any recognised legal standard, this Court should strike the punitive damages demand and dismiss it with prejudice. VII. CONCLUSION In summary, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state any claim upon which relief can be granted. The factual allegations do not support any element of battery or official misconduct. The arrest at issue, though later expunged, was not facially unlawful nor conducted in a manner that rises to civil tort liability. The claims are conclusory, the relief sought is unwarranted, and the Complaint as a whole fails to meet the threshold required to proceed to litigation. Accordingly, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Court dismiss the Complaint in its entirety with prejudice and grant such further relief as the Court deems just and proper. Date: 30th July 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Tobyrulles4568 Tobyrulles4568 Counsel of Record Attorney General Department of Justice E: [email protected] D: Toby Annex Building, Palmer State of Ridgeway –7–

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

RSC-CV-9099 Motion to Dismiss.pdf

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