SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
HOUSE OF GARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
REFRESHEDMANGO, in his official
capacity as Governor of the State of
Ridgeway,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-2892
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant, proceeding by and through the Solicitor General of Ridgeway,
hereby requests the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rid. R. Civ.
P. 12(a)(5) because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Attached hereto is a memorandum of law in support of Defendant’s Motion.
Dated: July 28, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
Palmer, Ridgeway.
/s/ BrendaPopplewell
BrendaPopplewell
Solicitor General
EffortlessBrit
Deputy Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Attorneys for Defendant
SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
HOUSE OF GARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
REFRESHEDMANGO, in his official
capacity as Governor of the State of
Ridgeway,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-2892
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM.
1
INTRODUCTION
The Department Cooperation Act, S8-19, 1st. Cong. (2025) (the “DCA”)
provides that “on-duty law enforcement officers” are prohibited from “arrest[ing],
cit[ing], or detain[ing] [other] on-duty law enforcement officer[s]” outside of
specific, well-delineated exceptions. Id., at § 4(a). Among these exceptions are when
the enforcement action is carried out by a “supervisor[]” or “a member of Internal
Affairs” (or after consent from such a person) or when an officer “[goes] rogue” and
“possesses an immediate threat to public safety.” Id., § 4(a)(i)-(v).
That makes sense. After all, law enforcement officers are not ordinarily
qualified to review the legality of a fellow officer’s actions; thus, the State Senate—
in passing the DCA—requires that instances of misconduct be handled by a superior,
rather than peers second-guessing each other’s independent decision-making on the
field. Plaintiff JamesGardai brings this suit on behalf of a homemade association,
the House of Gardai, (hereinafter, “Gardai”) and seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief striking the DCA as unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement.
This case does not belong in court. Gardai’s case presents nothing more than
a policy disagreement with the State of Ridgeway’s chosen mechanism for dealing
with misconduct by law enforcement; the DCA does not violate the House of
Gardai’s individual interests—indeed, the interest in enforcing the law is a sovereign
interest belonging to the State of Ridgeway—and the DCA falls squarely within the
2
Senate’s lawful exercise of its legislative powers. This Court should dismiss.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pleadings must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Rid. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Defendants may object to
the factual form of such allegations. Id. at 12(a)(5). To survive a motion to dismiss
under 12(a)(5), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted to be
true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A claim only
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to draw a
reasonable inference that defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ibid.
ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief.
The injunction is an extraordinary remedy; and not surprisingly so. From the
early days of our Republic, courts of equity have exercised their powers only where
legal remedies were inadequate and irreparable injury was imminent. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (“[C]ourts of equity should not act * * * when the
moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if
denied equitable relief.”) See also Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence
§959a, at 227 (“[Injunctive relief] ought . . . to be guarded with extreme caution, and
applied only in very clear cases”); 7A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal
3
Practice and Procedure §1751, p. 10, and n. 4 (4th ed. 2021) (bills of peace).
Indeed, a person seeking injunctive relief must face “a real and immediate
threat of repeated injury.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974); Murthy v.
Missouri, 603 U.S. ___ (2024) (slip op. at 11) (“[B]ecause the plaintiffs request
forward-looking relief, they must face a real and immediate threat of repeated
injury.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting O’Shea, slip op. at 11). See also
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158 (2014) (“An allegation of
future [irreparable injury] * * * suffice[s] if the threatened injury is certainly
impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur”)
This case does not carry that burden. Gardai asserts that the protections
afforded to law enforcement officers under the DCA “creat[es] a protected class
exempt from * * * [ordinary] law enforcement.” Pl’s. Comp. ¶ 26. Gardai argues that
the DCA arbitrarily denies to “ordinary civilians” and “other public employees” the
same protections, and denies them the equal protection of the laws. Id. But Gardai is
a law enforcement officer and benefits from the DCA. Thus, he lacks standing to sue
and falls short of demonstrating the “real and immediate threat of [irreparable harm]”
required to save a claim for injunctive relief. Murthy, at ___ (slip op. at 11).
Because Gardai fails to allege that he will face any harm—let alone “a real
and immediate threat of irreparable injury,” O’Shea, at 496—and because Gardai’s
non-existent injury would not be “redressable” by the injunctive relief they seek,
4
Murthy, at 1981, Gardai lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. Id.
II. Gardai Possesses No Interest in Enforcing the Laws.
The Complaint also suggests that Gardai has an “interest” in enforcing the
laws of the state; but that is patently false. To be sure, the “state [of Ridgeway]” has
a sovereign “interest in enforcing its laws.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
730-731 (1991). See also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 1975, 422 U.S. 922, 930 (a state’s
“[strong] interest in enforcing its criminal laws”); Sprint Communications, Inc. v.
Jacobs, 571 US 585, 590 (a state’s “[important] interest in enforcing the orders * * *
of its courts.”); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 (1987).
Thus, the State remains free to regulate that interest in whichever way it
pleases (even if Gardai may heavily disagree). If it wants, the Senate could decide
to abolish some of its criminal laws, or all of them, and it can exempt some public
officers from ordinary legal process, or all of them. See, e.g., Rid. Const. art. I, § 8
(affording only public officers and certain persons the right to indictment by a grand
jury).1 To the extent Gardai raises an individual right to enforce laws, that claim must
1 Without a doubt, the Senate has the power to “specif[y] [groups] * * * [who shall]
enjoy the right to be charged by grand jury indictment.” Rid. Const. art I, sec. 8. But
if the Senate has the power to grant to certain groups protection from ordinary
criminal prosecution, it must also have the power to grant protection from ordinary
arrests. In such cases, “[t]he greater power subsumes the lesser.” Lynnwood
Campbell v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 27 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Cf. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 450 (1990) (BRENNAN, J., concurring)
(discussing the majority’s “greater power includes the lesser” argument).
5
fail because that interest falls among the State of Ridgeway’s sovereign interests.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Court should dismiss Gardai’s Complaint.
Dated: July 28, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
Palmer, Ridgeway.
/s/ BrendaPopplewell
BrendaPopplewell
Solicitor General
EffortlessBrit
Deputy Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Attorneys for Defendant
Certificate of Service
I, the undersigned counsel, do hereby certify that a copy of this document and
its contents have, on July 28, 2025, been filed with the Clerk of Court by CM/ECF
system and that the CM/ECF system will serve an electronic copy of this document
on all parties and counsel of record.
Dated: July 28, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
Palmer, Ridgeway.
/s/ BrendaPopplewell
BrendaPopplewell
Solicitor General
EffortlessBrit
Deputy Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Attorneys for Defendant
