IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
HOUSE OF GARDAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICKVICARIO, in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of Ridgeway,
Defendant.
Case No.
CIVIL COMPLAINT
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The House of Gardai, by and through the undersigned counsel, for its complaint against
Defendant RickVicario, alleges as follows:
PARTIES
1. Plaintiff House of Gardai is an association in the State of Ridgeway.
2. Defendant RickVicario is the Governor of the State of Ridgeway. He is sued in
his official capacity.
JURISDICTION & VENUE
3. The jurisdiction of the Court originates from Art. V, Sec. IV which states “There
shall be a Superior court which shall exercise original jurisdiction for all civil and criminal cases
or controversies…”
4. Venue is proper as the actions that took place as stated within this complaint
occurred in Ridgeway County or an area which is subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
INTRODUCTION
5. “The rule of law in our country began in the 1600s, when persons fled Europe in
order to have the freedom to practice whatever religion they choose. The common theme of all
religions is to follow the law because that is what good people do. It has been the tradition in our
country since the very beginning.”1
1 Hon. T. W. Small (Ret.), The rule of law is powerful and fragile; it’s your job to protect it, Nat’l Jud. Coll. (May
18, 2020), https://www.judges.org/news-and-info/the-rule-of-law-is-powerful-and-fragile-its-your-job-to-protect-it/
6. “[T]he public [has a] commitment to the rule of law,”2 and it is imperative that
those in positions of authority honor and uphold that commitment to maintain the legitimacy of
our legal system and protect the rights of all individuals.
7. The House of Gardai is a secret societal order consisting of certified law
enforcement officers of the State of Ridgeway that uphold the rule of law. Whenever a member
of the House witnesses a breach of law–whether it be a fellow law enforcement officer, a tow
truck driver, or a normal civilian–it is not a matter of discretion, but duty for members of the
House. The law does not excuse inconvenience, nor does the House of Gardai. Because once the
law is bent for one, it is bent for all.
8. This is a pre-enforcement suit in relation to S8-18 | Department Cooperation Act.
The House of Gardai possesses associational standing to bring this suit.3
9. Pre-enforcement challenges have standing when there is a “threatened or actual
injury resulting from the putatively illegal action...” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)
(quoting Linda R. S. v. Richard D, 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)); see also Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-154 (1970).
10. To retain standing, a plaintiff needs an “injury in fact—an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
11. Of course, pre-enforcement challenges cannot allege an injury in fact because one
has not occurred yet, so to satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement, a plaintiff must allege “an
3 An association has standing to sue to redress its members’ injuries, even when the association has not itself
suffered injury, when: “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local
571 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 553 (1996) (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. at 343). See also Int’l Union v. Brock, 477 U.S. at 282–90 (applying the three-part test and determining
that an automobile workers union had associational standing to challenge a Department of Labor policy directive
interpreting the trade readjustment allowance (TRA) benefit eligibility provisions of the Trade Act of 1974). Some
argue that an association is able to more effectively advance the shared interests of its members by pooling financial
resources and expertise. Id. at 290 (“[T]he primary reason people join an organization is often to create an effective
vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others.”).
2 Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View (2010)
intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but
prescribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014)(quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S.
289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA., 568 U.
S. 398 (2013) (holding that “[a]n allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury
is “certainly impending,” or there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”)
12. The reason for such a procedure is so that a plaintiff is not put in a position where
he must “first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute
that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
459, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). Thus, the injury in fact requirement is only met
when “threatened enforcement [of a law is] sufficiently imminent.” Driehaus, supra.
13. Plaintiff House of Gardai is an association of dedicated law enforcement officers
who are uniquely committed to upholding the rule of law impartially and without favor or bias,
including enforcing laws against fellow law enforcement officers and civil service employees.
14. Unlike many agencies or groups that may hesitate or decline to hold law
enforcement or civil service employees accountable, the House of Gardai actively embraces the
difficult and essential role of ensuring that no person is above the law.
15. This commitment is fundamental to Plaintiff’s purpose and mission and places
Plaintiff and its members in a distinct position to challenge the Department Cooperation Act,
which unlawfully shields certain public servants from accountability and criminalizes Plaintiff’s
members for performing their lawful duties.
16. Plaintiff and its members intend to continue lawfully arresting, citing, and
detaining individuals who violate the law–including government officials–consistent with their
statutory duties. The Department Cooperation Act threatens criminal penalties for doing so
without prior approval, thereby deterring members from performing their lawful duties. This
credible threat of enforcement gives rise to a concrete and particularized injury under established
pre-enforcement standing doctrine.
17. The credible threat of prosecution under the Department Cooperation Act for
lawful enforcement activities creates a concrete, particularized, and imminent injury sufficient to
establish pre-enforcement standing. Plaintiff does not allege hypothetical or conjectural injury,
but a realistic danger that its members will be criminally penalized if they continue fulfilling
their mission.
18. Plaintiff therefore seeks a declaratory judgment that the Department Cooperation
Act is invalid under and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
plaintiffs also seek an order preliminarily and permanently enjoining the State of Ridgeway,
including its officers, employees, and agents from implementing or enforcing the Department
Cooperation Act.
FACTUAL STATEMENTS
19. On or about the date of July 1st, 2025, Governor RickVicario signed S8-18 |
Department Cooperation Act into law.
20. The Department Cooperation Act, in part, provides:
Section 4. Prohibition of Arrests & Citations on Law Enforcement Officers
(a) No on-duty law enforcement officer shall have the authority to arrest, cite, or
detain another on-duty law enforcement officer except when the following
circumstances have been met:
(i) The arresting, citing, or detaining officer is acting under the direction of
the Attorney General’s Office.
(ii) The arresting, citing, or detaining officer is a member of the Internal
Affairs Division or another body dedicated to the enforcement of
department policy as the officer subject to such actions; or
(iii) The arresting, citing, or detaining officer is holds a supervisory position
within the same agency as the officer subject to such action; or
(iv) The officer subject to the detention, arrest, or citation belongs to a
different law enforcement agency, and prior consent has been obtained
from that agency’s command members; or
(v) The officer is acting in a rogue capacity and possesses an immediate threat
to public safety, or is actively committing an offense that possesses a
severe threat to life, and there is no reasonable opportunity to seek agency
consent without compromising public safety or the integrity of the
response.
Section 5. Prohibition of Arrests & Citations on Civil Service Employees
(a) For the purpose of this act, civil service agencies shall be classified as the
following departments:
(i) The Ridgeway National Guard, the Ridgeway Department of Justice, the
Ridgeway Department of State, the Ridgeway Parks Service, the
Ridgeway State Senate, the Ridgeway County Fire Department, and the
Ridgeway Department of Corrections.
(b) No on-duty law enforcement officer shall have the authority to arrest, cite, or
detain another on-duty civil service employee except when the following
circumstances have been met:
(i) The arresting, citing, or detaining officer is acting under the direction of
the Attorney General’s Office.
(ii) The arresting, citing, or detaining officer is acting under direct orders from
a supervisory official who has authority over the civil service employee’s
department or agency; or
(iii) The arresting, citing, or detaining officer has obtained prior consent from a
supervisory member of the civil service employee’s department or agency;
or
(iv) The civil service employee is actively engaged in criminal conduct which
constitutes an immediate threat to public safety, or involves an offense
posing a severe threat to life, and there is no reasonable means of
obtaining supervisory consent without endangering public safety or
compromising the immediacy of the law enforcement response.
(v) For the purpose of this act, all approval must come from the agency's
internal affairs or other respective unit dedicated to the enforcement of
department policy, or the respective departments third-in-command and
higher.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - 1 R. Stat. § 3201)
21. All allegations in the previous paragraphs are incorporated as reference as if fully
set forth herein.
22. Pursuant to 1 R. Stat. § 3201, “[a]ny policy, order, procedure, or directive that
impedes on an individuals rights, immunities, or privileges secured by law, charter, or the
constitution shall be subject to the injunctive relief of a permanent restraining order against the
government prohibiting them from enacting this policy, order, procedure, or directive; and
injunctive relief reversing any harm done.”
23. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
24. The Equal Protection Clause demands that those “similarly situated” receive
equal protection under law. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
25. The Department Cooperation Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by treating law enforcement officers and civil service employees
differently based solely on their department affiliation, without any rational or state interest
justifying such classifications.
26. The Department Cooperation Act prohibits on-duty law enforcement officers
from arresting, citing, or detaining other law enforcement officers except under narrow,
enumerated circumstances requiring supervisory consent, intra-agency approval, or direct orders
from the Attorney General’s Office, arbitrarily restricting the authority of certain officers to
enforce the law against other officers, creating a protected class exempt from ordinary law
enforcement scrutiny unless pre-approved. Meanwhile, ordinary civilians or other public
employees not subject to the provisions of the Act are subject to immediate law enforcement
actions without such hurdles.
27. Likewise, the Act grants civil service employees a special status exempting them
from arrest, citation, or detention except under additional restrictions such as requiring
higher-level supervisory consent. These exemptions shield certain government officials from
equal accountability and undermine the principle that no one is above the law.
28. The Act draws arbitrary distinctions between similarly situated
individuals–government officials and ordinary civilians–by exempting the former from arrest or
citation unless burdensome internal procedures are followed. No rational or compelling state
interest justifies this classification.
29. The result is a two-tiered system of enforcement: ordinary civilians may be
arrested upon probable cause, while government employees are protected from accountability
unless procedural barriers are first overcome. This violates the principle of equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
30. For example, under the Act, a civilian may be immediately arrested by an officer
for assaulting someone in public. But if a civil service employee or another officer commits the
same act, Plaintiff’s members cannot arrest them without prior agency approval–creating an
unjustified disparity in enforcement capacity.
31. Plaintiff House of Gardai and its members are similarly situated to other law
enforcement officers in that they are authorized and obligated to enforce state law. However, the
Act irrationally denies Plaintiff’s members the equal ability to take enforcement action against
other public officials, subjecting them to criminal exposure or discipline merely for doing what
other officers may do freely with respect to civilians. These burdens do not apply evenly and
create a disfavored subclass of law enforcers tasked with unequal duties and risks.
32. When legislation is passed that conflicts with the federal constitution, “federal
law prevails” Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 190 (1979), and state legislation
“may not contravene federal law.” Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 22 (2013).
33. Plaintiff House of Gardai and its members are uniquely committed to upholding
the rule of law impartially. The Act’s classifications directly interfere with Plaintiff’s members’
ability and duty to arrest, cite, and detain all violators of law equally.
34. The House of Gardai’s members are employed by the Palmer Police Department
and the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office. The Act criminalizes Plaintiff’s members’ otherwise
lawful enforcement duties, see 6 R. Stat. §§ 3108, et seq. and 2101 et seq., unless they first
secure internal agency or supervisory approval. This disparate treatment deprives Gardai
members of equal protection by singling out their actions for criminal liability not applied to
similarly situated officers who arrest civilians which interferes with their official capacity,
exposes them to disciplinary risk for fulfilling their sworn obligations, and chills their
willingness to enforce the law impartially. As a result, the House of Gardai is forced to either
violate its mission or expose its members to potential liability for enforcing the law equally.
35. The Supremacy Clause provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof…shall be the supreme Law of the
Land…any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.
36. The Department Cooperation Act, S8-18, violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment by creating classifications that immunize certain law enforcement
officers and civil service employees from arrest, citation, or detention by others, while
simultaneously criminalizing members of the House of Gardai for performing lawful
enforcement actions against these protected groups.
37. The State of Ridgeway thereby deprives the House of Gardai and its members of
the ability to enforce laws impartially against all persons, regardless of official status, by
imposing procedural barriers and criminal penalties that do not apply equally to all law
enforcement officers or civil servants.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of Ridgeway Const. art I, sec. IV - 1 R. Stat. § 3201
38. All allegations in the previous paragraphs are incorporated as reference as if fully
set forth herein.
39. Pursuant to 1 R. Stat. § 3201, “[a]ny policy, order, procedure, or directive that
impedes on an individuals rights, immunities, or privileges secured by law, charter, or the
constitution shall be subject to the injunctive relief of a permanent restraining order against the
government prohibiting them from enacting this policy, order, procedure, or directive; and
injunctive relief reversing any harm done.”
40. Ridgeway Const. art I, sec. IV provides that the “government is…instituted for
the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for
the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, or set of persons.”
41. The Department Cooperation Act gives a favored class, civil service employees
and law enforcement officers, immunity from enforcement by other law enforcement officers
unless extensive procedures are followed.
42. This class is treated differently than ordinary citizens. Officers, instead of being
praised for doing their job, are instead criminalized for enforcing the law against them, but not
against others.
43. The Act creates an unaccountable tier of public employees, violating Ridgeway
Const. art. I, sec. IV by placing them above the law and creating an elite, shielded class.
44. The House of Gardai–an association charged with enforcing the law without fear
or favor–is directly injured by this arrangement. Its members are subject to criminal liability for
enforcing the law against this elite class, thereby frustrating its mission and impairing its core
function of impartially enforcing the law.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of Ridgeway Const. art I, sec. I - 1 R. Stat. § 3201)
45. All allegations in the previous paragraphs are incorporated as reference as if fully
set forth herein.
46. Pursuant to 1 R. Stat. § 3201, “[a]ny policy, order, procedure, or directive that
impedes on an individuals rights, immunities, or privileges secured by law, charter, or the
constitution shall be subject to the injunctive relief of a permanent restraining order against the
government prohibiting them from enacting this policy, order, procedure, or directive; and
injunctive relief reversing any harm done.”
47. Ridgeway Const. art I, sec. I provides that “[e]very person ought to obtain right
and justice, freely, and…completely and without any denial…[and] promptly and without
delay.”
48. Ridgeway Citizens, and by extension, law enforcement officers, are entitled to
remedies when laws are violated. By preventing the House of Gardai and its members from
issuing citations or arrests against civil service employees unless administrative protocols are
satisfied, the Act delays justice for victims and denies equal access to enforcement remedies.
49. The Department Cooperation Act blocks law enforcement officers from arresting,
citing, or detaining certain persons solely based on department affiliation, and in doing so,
denying legal remedy to victims of their misconduct. When a public employee under the
Department Cooperation Act breaks the law, the Act prevents immediate enforcement, denying
and delaying justice.
50. As an association of law enforcement officers, the House is legally and ethically
bound to provide prompt and impartial enforcement of the law. The Act impairs that obligation
and subjects Gardai members to potential sanction for fulfilling their lawful duties under state
law. See 6 R. Stat. §§ 3108, et seq. and 2101 et seq.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Substantive Due Process - 1 R. Stat. § 3201)
51. All allegations in the previous paragraphs are incorporated as reference as if fully
set forth herein.
52. Pursuant to 1 R. Stat. § 3201, “[a]ny policy, order, procedure, or directive that
impedes on an individuals rights, immunities, or privileges secured by law, charter, or the
constitution shall be subject to the injunctive relief of a permanent restraining order against the
government prohibiting them from enacting this policy, order, procedure, or directive; and
injunctive relief reversing any harm done.”
53. There is a two step method for analyzing substantive due process: “First…the
Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. Second,
we have required in substantive-due-process cases a careful description of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest. Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the
crucial guideposts for responsible decisionmaking that direct and restrain our exposition of the
Due Process Clause.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
54. If a fundamental liberty interest is infringed, the next step is to determine if the
“infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, at 302 (1993).
55. Policing is deeply rooted in U.S. tradition. “The origins of modern-day policing
can be traced back to the ‘Slave Patrol.’ The earliest formal slave patrol was created in the
Carolinas in the early 1700s with one mission: to establish a system of terror and squash slave
uprisings with the capacity to pursue, apprehend, and return runaway slaves to their owners.
Tactics included the use of excessive force to control and produce desired slave behavior.”4
4 NAACP, Origins of Modern-Day Policing,
https://naacp.org/find-resources/history-explained/origins-modern-day-policing (last visited July 22, 2025).
56. The right of law enforcement officers to equally enforce criminal laws against all
persons–including government officials without arbitrary restrictions, retaliation, or politically
motivated interference, is deeply rooted in history and tradition.
57. The Magna Carta, for example, one of the earliest historical documents, states
that “[t]o no-one will we sell or deny of delay right or justice,” establishing and exemplifying
the principle of equal justice under the law.
58. The Supreme Court of the United States, even, has recognized this principle
numerous times. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (“No man in this country is
so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with
impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the
law and are bound to obey it.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (“The Government of
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.)
59. The law does not pass strict scrutiny.
60. First, there is no compelling state interest that justifies the law. Upon information
and belief, the law was likely enacted to avoid inter-agency conflicts, but this is not compelling
enough to avoid accountability for law enforcement officers and civil service employees subject
under the Act. The right to immediate justice completely outweighs the State’s desire to avoid
drama.
61. Second, the law is not narrowly tailored. It is much too broad. Take, for example,
an officer who beat a suspect with his baton for no reason. Under the Act, another officer would
be blocked from detaining, arresting, or citing the officer. Additionally, there are less extreme
solutions. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) (“[T]he Commonwealth has not shown
that it seriously undertook to address the problem with less intrusive tools readily available to
it.”) Instead of outright banning arrests, detainments, and citations, the State could implement
required evaluations of the arrests, detainments, and citations of government officials.
62. The Act’s infringement on the House of Gardai’s fundamental duty to impartial
enforcement is anathema to centuries of Anglo-American history. By placing government
employees above the law, it forces Gardai members to betray their oath or risk prosecution–a
Hobson’s choice that violates substantive due process.
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff requests that the court grant relief as follows:
63. A declaratory judgment that the Department Cooperation Act is unconstitutional,
and is, thus invalid, null, and void;
64. A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the State of Ridgeway,
including its department heads, officers, employees, and agents from enforcing the Department
Cooperation Act;
65. All court costs and fees; and
66. Any other relief that the court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted.
Date: 07/22/2025
_________________________________
JamesGardai, Esq.
Rid. Bar. No. 10244
Newfounding Father
House of Gardai
Palmer, Ridgeway
D: fishfromocean
Counsel of Record
