SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
THR33SIX8,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZARTALOX, THORSTRUCKED; and
RIDGEWAY STATE POLICE,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-2201
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendants, proceeding by and through the Solicitor General of Ridgeway,
hereby requests the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rid. R. Civ.
P. 12(a)(5) because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Attached hereto is a memorandum of law in support of Defendants’ Motion.
Dated: July 20, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
Palmer, Ridgeway.
/s/ BrendaPopplewell
BrendaPopplewell
Solicitor General
EffortlessBrit
Deputy Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Attorneys for Defendants
SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
THR33SIX8,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZARTALOX, THORSTRUCKED; and
RIDGEWAY STATE POLICE,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-2201
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RID. R. CIV. P. 12(A)(5)
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
.
1
INTRODUCTION
On July 3, 2025, Plaintiff thr33six8 shot Defendant Zartalox, Senior Trooper
in the Ridgeway State Police, (“Trooper Zatalox”) with a firearm when Zartalox
apprehended him. Plaintiff’s multiple shots seriously wounded Trooper Zartalox and
hit a different officer in the head. That was far from the first time. Earlier that day,
Plaintiff had shot and killed a different law enforcement officer and was deemed to
be Lethal-Force-Authoriced (“LFA”); a term used by law enforcement to describe
criminals who pose a serious risk of death or bodily injury to others.
During the exchange of gunfire, Trooper Zartalox shot and killed Plaintiff in
self-defense of himself and others. Were the shoe on the other foot, Plaintiff—we
assume—would have done the same. Trooper Zartalox’s actions were perfectly
reasonable and made in lawful self-defense. Nonetheless, Plaintiff filed a frivolous
complaint against Trooper Zartalox with Director Thorstrucked of the Internal
Affairs Division of the Ridgeway State Police. That complaint was not sustained.
Now, Plaintiff again brings this frivolous and harassing action against Trooper
Zartalox and Director Thorstrucked, seeking both damages and an injunction
requiring Director Thorstrucked to discharge Trooper Zartalox. That is untenable.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pleadings must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Rid. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Defendants may object to
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the factual form of such allegations. Id. at 12(a)(5). To survive a motion to dismiss
under 12(a)(5), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted to be
true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A claim only
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to draw a
reasonable inference that defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ibid.
ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief.
The injunction is an extraordinary remedy; and not surprisingly so. From the
early days of our Republic, courts of equity have exercised their powers only where
legal remedies were inadequate and irreparable injury was imminent. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (“[C]ourts of equity should not act * * * when the
moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if
denied equitable relief.”) See also Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence
§959a, at 227 (“[Injunctive relief] ought . . . to be guarded with extreme caution, and
applied only in very clear cases”). Indeed, a person seeking injunctive relief must
face “a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 496 (1974); Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. ___ (2024) (slip op. at 11)
(“[B]ecause the plaintiffs request forward-looking relief, they must face a real and
immediate threat of repeated injury.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
3
O’Shea, slip op. at 11). See also Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149,
158 (2014) (“An allegation of future injury * * * suffice[s] if the threatened injury
is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur”)
This case does not carry that burden. Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks injunctive
relief “terminat[ing] Trooper Zartalox’s employment with the Ridgeway State
Police”, “issu[ing] a formal reprimand or verbal warning to Lieutenant Thorstrucked
for his failure to act” and “[ordering] a thorough investigation [into] Zartalox’s
conduct * * *” Pl’s. Comp. at ¶ 36. But Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue injunctive
relief at all: (1) he does not allege that, in the future, he will suffer harm by Trooper
Zartalox or Director Thurstrucked; and (2) the injunction sought would serve to
punish Defendants rather than to “redress[]” an anticipated injury. Murthy, at 1981
(“To establish standing, the plaintiffs must demonstrate a substantial risk that, in the
near future, they will suffer an injury that is traceable to a Government defendant
and redressable by the injunction they seek.”). See also Carroll v. President and
Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183-184 (1968) (“[Injunctions] * * * must
be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective
permitted by constitutional mandate and the needs of the public order.”)
Because Plaintiff fails to allege that he will face “a real and immediate threat
of irreparable injury,” O’Shea, at 496, and because such an injury would not be
“redressable” by the punitive and harassing injunction sought, Murthy, at 1981,
4
Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. Id.
II. Trooper Zartalox and Director Thurstrucked are Entitled to Qualified
Immunity for their Official Acts.
Qualified immunity protects government officials from “liability for civil
damages * * * insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Courts resolving questions of qualified
immunity are required to resolve a threshold question: “Taken in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001).
This must be the “initial inquiry.” Id. If, and only if, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were violated, “the next, sequential step is to ask whether the
right was clearly established * * * in light of the specific context of the case.” Id.
Plaintiff’s Complaint brings various state tort claims against Trooper Zartalox and
Director Thorstrucked. Because Plaintiff seeks damages, Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity unless they violated a clearly established right.
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Trooper Zartalox shot Plaintiff
in lawful self-defense; and Director Thorstrucked made no mistake in denying
Plaintiff’s frivolous and harassing complaint against Trooper Zartalox.
Start with self-defense. When Trooper Zartalox apprehended Plaintiff—who
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was wanted and had been declared LFA for murdering law enforcement officers
earlier the same day—Plaintiff took out a firearm and fired multiple shots hitting
Trooper Zartalox and a nearby law enforcement officer in the head. Plaintiff admits
as much. Pl’s. Comp. at ¶ 10 (“Plaintiff retrieved a [Solami firearm] * * * [and] fired
the Solami * * *, striking Trooper Zartalox); id., at ¶ 14 (“one of Plaintiff’s shots
* * * [also] struck Park Ranger I Ontario_RBLX in the head.”) Thus, Trooper
Zartalox acted in lawful self-defense; and his acts were not unreasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because he “ha[d] probable cause * * * to believe
that [Plaintiff] [had committed a felony and] pose[d] a threat to the safety of the
officers or a danger to the community if left at large.” See Tennessee v. Garner, 471
US 1, 6(1985) (citation omitted); id., at 11 (“Where the officer has probable cause
to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer
or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to * * * us[e] deadly force.”)
Moreover, Director Thorstrucked correctly denied Plaintiff’s complaint
against Trooper Zartalox: Trooper Zartalox acted in lawful self-defense of himself
and others in shooting Plaintiff. Thus, Director Thorstrucked acted lawfully in
discharging his duties and is similarly entitled to qualified immunity.
III. Plaintiff’s Substantive Due Process Claims should be Dismissed Because
the Fourth Amendment is the Appropriate Vehicle.
Plaintiff’s Complaint presents a hodgepodge of Fourth Amendment and
6
Fourteenth Amendment theories of a liability. On one hand, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants’ acts violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
seizures. On the other, he alleges that Defendants deprived him of life, liberty, or
property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. To be sure, “apprehension by
the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.” Garner, at 8. Where the Fourth Amendment “provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection” against a particular government
action, “that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due
process,’ must be the guide for analyzing” such a claim. Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 (1989). See also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality
opinion) (excessive-force claims must be reviewed under the Fourth Amendment
rather than “the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process.’”)
Because Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts an excessive-force claim best suited for
review under the reasonableness-requirement of the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff’s
substantive due process claims should be dismissed. Id., at 288 (“Because the Fourth
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against
this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the
more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for
analyzing these claims.”) (emphasis added).
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IV. The Ridgeway State Police is Entitled to Sovereign Immunity From
Plaintiff’s Claims for Punitive Damages.
A State “cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.” Railroad Co.
v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337, 339 (1880). This principle reflects the inherent nature
of sovereignty, wherein a State cannot be subject to the litigation of an individual
without its consent. See Federalist No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is inherent in
the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent.”). Thus, the State gives itself immunity from any claim except for a few in
which the legislature explicitly authorizes suit against the government. Under the
Civil Claims Act, “[t]he government * * * is immune from all claims,” except those
under Section 2, “and later laws [unless] liability is explicitly created against the
government.” 1 R. Stat. § 3203. See also 1 R. Stat. § 3204 (“No monetary damage
shall be awarded in a case against the government * * *.”)
Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks punitive damages of $4,850.00 against the
Ridgeway State Police pursuant to 1 R. Stat. § 3115 and 1 R. Stat. § 3114. But the
State has not waived its sovereign immunity for those torts; and § 3114 only allows
damages to be imposed against the State in very limited circumstances where the
Solicitor General has expressly consented to such and the damages are
“compensatory” rather than “punitive or exemplary.” Id., at § 3114(c). Thus, the
Ridgeway State Police is entitled to sovereign immunity on Plaintiff’s claims for
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punitive damages against it.
CONCLUSION
The Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety and entitle
Trooper Zartalox and Director Thorstrucked to qualified immunity.
Dated: July 20, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
Palmer, Ridgeway.
/s/ BrendaPopplewell
BrendaPopplewell
Solicitor General
EffortlessBrit
Deputy Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Attorneys for Defendants
9
Certificate of Service
I, the undersigned counsel, do hereby certify that a copy of this document and
its contents have, on July 20, 2025, been filed with the Clerk of Court by CM/ECF
system and that the CM/ECF system will serve an electronic copy of this document
on all parties and counsel of record.
Dated: July 20, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
Palmer, Ridgeway.
/s/ BrendaPopplewell
BrendaPopplewell
Solicitor General
EffortlessBrit
Deputy Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Attorneys for Defendants
