DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
State of Ridgeway,
-against-
CarnageCulture,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-2862
MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant, Colonel CarnageCulture, by and through his undersigned counsel,
respectfully moves this Court to dismiss the Complaint for Declaratory Relief filed by
the State of Ridgeway (“Plaintiff”) in its entirety for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
INTRODUCTION
1. This case represents a procedurally improper attempt to litigate an internal
executive branch policy dispute. The State of Ridgeway, via its Solicitor General, has
sued the State of Ridgeway’s chief law enforcement officer. To circumvent the
obvious jurisdictional bar against the State suing itself, the Plaintiff has constructed
an unusual legal theory based on a misapplication of the doctrine established in Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Complaint must be dismissed for three primary
reasons:
a. The doctrine of Ex parte Young does not grant the State standing to sue its own
officials. It is a shield for citizens to protect them from unconstitutional state
action, not a sword for one state agency to wield against another. This remains
a non-justiciable intra-branch political question.
b. The post-revocation hearing process provided to license holders satisfies the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly given the State’s
overwhelming interest in regulating access to fully automatic weapons.
c. The Colonel’s consideration of arrest records is rationally related to the
legitimate government interest of public safety.
LEGAL STANDARD
2. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. Furthermore, a claim must be
dismissed if the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacks
standing or the issue is non-justiciable.
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION BECAUSE EX PARTE YOUNG DOES NOT
AUTHORIZE THE STATE TO SUE ITSELF.
3. The most fundamental defect in this lawsuit is that the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s
office are one and the same: the State of Ridgeway. The Plaintiff attempts to bypass
this fatal flaw by suing the Colonel in his “individual capacity,” arguing that his
allegedly unconstitutional acts “stripped him of his official or representative
character.” This is a misreading of the Ex parte Young doctrine.
4. Ex parte Young created a narrow exception to state sovereign immunity to ensure
that private citizens could sue state officials to enjoin the enforcement of an
unconstitutional state law. It prevents a state from using its own immunity as a
shield to violate the federal rights of its people. It was never intended to be a
mechanism for the State, as an entity, to resolve its own internal disagreements. The
Plaintiff has cited no authority, because none exists, where a State has successfully
invoked Ex parte Young and parens patriae to sue one of its own executive officers.
5. If, as Plaintiff argues, the Colonel’s allegedly unconstitutional actions “cannot be
attributable to the state,” then the State itself has suffered no injury and has no basis
to sue. If, on the other hand, the actions are attributable to the State, then the State is
suing itself, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over what is plainly a non-justiciable
political question better resolved by the Governor.
6. Furthermore, the relief sought by the Plaintiff—an injunction ordering the
reinstatement of licenses and enjoining the Colonel's “officers, employees, agents,
servants”—is a remedy against the office of the Colonel, not against CarnageCulture
the private citizen. If Colonel CarnageCulture were to resign tomorrow, the Plaintiff
would surely expect any injunction to apply to his successor. This proves that this is,
in substance and effect, a suit against the State, regardless of the “individual
capacity” label. The attempt to use Ex parte Young is just an attempt to disguise an
internal policy dispute as a constitutional claim, and it fails.
II. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR A VIOLATION OF
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
7. Even if jurisdiction existed, the Complaint fails to state a valid claim. Plaintiff alleges
that revoking Advanced Firearms Licenses (AFLs) without a pre-deprivation hearing
violates due process. This is incorrect.
8. The Supreme Court has established a three-part balancing test to determine what
process is due. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Applying that test here:
9. The Private Interest:
a. The interest is in a state-issued license for fully automatic weapons, which the
Complaint concedes are not arms protected by the Second Amendment. This
is a state-created privilege, not a fundamental right.
10. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation:
a. The risk is mitigated by the post-revocation appeal process that the Complaint
admits exists.
11. The Government's Interest:
a. The government’s interest is the dominant need to protect the public from the
extreme danger posed by automatic weapons. When a license holder is
arrested—indicating probable cause of criminal conduct—the State has a
compelling, urgent interest in removing those weapons from circulation
immediately.
12. Balancing these factors, the State’s interest in “quick action” overwhelmingly
justifies a post-deprivation hearing process. The procedure described in the
Complaint is constitutional.
III. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR A VIOLATION OF
EQUAL PROTECTION.
13. Plaintiff’s final claim is that using arrest records as a basis for revocation is
“arbitrary and capricious.” Because this does not involve a suspect class or
fundamental right, the Colonel’s policy need only pass the rational basis test. It
easily does.
14. An arrest is not proof of guilt, but it is official, documented evidence an officer or
magistrate found probable cause to believe the individual committed an offense. For
the limited purpose of assessing the ongoing risk and responsibility of a person
licensed to possess a machine gun, it is eminently rational for the State’s chief law
enforcement officer to consider this fact. The policy is directly and rationally related
to the legitimate state interest of public safety.
CONCLUSION
15. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court dismiss
the Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: July 19, 2025
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0xSyns
