SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARNAGECULTURE, Colonel of the
Ridgeway State Police, in his individual
capacity,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-2862
STATE’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
.
INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Firearms Act, S6-21, 1st. Cong. (2025) (the “CFA”) provides that
persons seeking to own firearms “capably of fully automatic fire * * * [must obtain] an Advanced
Firearms License.” Id. § 5.1(a). Although fully automatic firearms are not considered arms
protected under the 2nd Amendment, Advanced Firearms Licenses (“AFLs”) nonetheless afford
citizens the unique opportunity to enjoy such arms; and license holders are entitled to due process
before they are deprived of their AFLs. CFA, § 5.2(d)(i) (“There shall be due process for the
revocation of an active AFL.”) See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall * * * deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”) Nonetheless, Defendant has
hastily revoked and continues to revoke tens of active AFLs without providing license holders
prior notice and the opportunity for a hearing; and instead affords license holders 24 hours to
submit a last-minute “statement of appeal” before their licenses are shredded. That is untenable.
LEGAL STANDARD
A temporary restraining order is designed to preserve the status quo until there is an
opportunity to hold a hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction. See 11A Charles A.
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2951, at 253 (2d ed.1995). A temporary
restraining order is restricted to its “underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing
irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose
Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974) (footnote
omitted). A party seeking a temporary restraining order must make four showings: (1) that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm; (3) that the balance
of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiff is Likely to Succeed on the Merits
A. Defendant’s Actions Violate License Holders’ Rights under the CFA and/or the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Under the CFA and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, license holders are
entitled to “due process of law” prior to being deprived of their AFLs. CFA, § 5.2(d)(i) (“There
shall be due process for the revocation of an active AFL.”) See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No
State shall * * * deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”)
(emphasis added). Due process of law requires a pre-deprivation hearing. Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US, at 314 (holding that the deprivation of life, liberty or property
must at a minimum be preceded by “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature
of the case.”) So-called post-deprivation hearings are allowed only where quick action by the state
is essential or pre-deprivation hearings are impracticable. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422, 436 (1982) (pre-deprivation hearing required absent “quick action by the State or the
impracticality of providing any pre-deprivation process”) (emphasis added).
Defendant’s practice of revoking tens of citizens’ AFLs without prior notice and an
opportunity to be heard is not justified by the need for “quick action” by the state; nor would it be
“impractica[ble]” to afford license holders notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to revoking
their AFLs. Id. Defendant no doubt has the means to provide every license holder the opportunity
to submit a statement of appeal after their license has been revoked; by the same token, Defendant
also has the means to provide every license holder a similar opportunity to be heard prior to
revoking their AFLs. Thus, impracticability is not on the table. Nor is the need for “quick action.”
Indeed, most—if not every single one—of Defendant’s revocations, have been based on the license
holders having obtained one or more arrest records. That can hardly be considered exigent.
B. Defendant’s Actions Violate License Holders’ Rights under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
More troubling, is Defendant’s blatant discrimination against license holders based on their
arrest records. “The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value
in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct.” Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.
232, 241 (1957). In Schware, the Supreme Court found that the State Bar of New Mexico could
not infer “bad moral character” based on “the arrests of petitioner.” Id., at 241-243. Indeed, not
only had the arrests occurred years ago, but “in no case was [Schware] ever tried or convicted for
the offense for which he was arrested.” Id., at 243. The Court could have ended its analysis there,
but it went further: “An arrest” writes Justice Black “shows nothing more than that someone
probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense.” So, when formal charges are not filed
against the arrested person and he is released without trial, “whatever probative force the arrest
may have had is normally dissipated.” Id., at 241 (footnote omitted).
So too here. The Equal Protection Clause—which forbids a state from “deny[ing] to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”—of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects license holders from “arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious” action. Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 291 U.S. 525 (1934). In our state, only a conviction carries significance as to a
person’s involvement in criminal behavior, Schware, at 241; Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718,
724 (D.D.C. 1971) (citing Schware, at 241), and the Due Process Clause cloaks an accused with a
presumption of innocence, Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 487 (1978) (presumption of
innocence may not be rebutted by “official suspicion”). Thus, Defendant’s actions in revoking
active AFLs based on arrest records, without more, is “wholly arbitrary * * * [and] offends the
dictates of reason or offends the Due Process Clause.” Schware, at 249.
II. Plaintiff is Likely to Suffer Irreparable Harm
The state of Ridgeway is likely to suffer irreparable harm. Defendant’s actions irreparably
harm the state’s interest in promoting the rights available to its citizens under the CFA and the
Federal Constitution. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 US 592,
608 (1982) (“[A] [s]tate does have a[] [parens patriae] interest * * * in assuring that the benefits
of the federal system are not denied to its general population.”) (emphasis added). See also Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of [constitutional freedoms], for even minimal
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”); BST Holdings, LLC v. OSHA, 17
F.4th 604, 618 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he loss of constitutional freedoms . . . ‘unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury.’” (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976))); League of
Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Obama for Am.
v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012)); Williams v. Salerno, 792 F.2d 323, 326 (2d Cir.
1986); Alt. Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876 (3d Cir.1997))).
III. The Balance of Equities Tip in Plaintiff’s Favor and the Public is not Disserved by
Injunction
The balance of equities tip in Plaintiff’s favor and the public interest is best served by
injunction. Defendant’s countless revocations of active AFLs without prior notice and opportunity
for hearing are “likely unconstitutional” so “[a]ny interest” Defendant “may claim in enforcing
[them] is illegitimate.” See BST Holdings, 17 F.4th at 618; see also Ingebrigtsen v. Jackson Public
Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that where an enactment is unconstitutional,
“the public interest [is] not disserved by an injunction preventing its implementation”). Moreover,
“it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Baird
v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant the petition for a Temporary Restraining Order.
Dated: July 18, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
Palmer, Ridgeway.
/s/ BrendaPopplewell
BrendaPopplewell
Solicitor General
EffortlessBrit
Deputy Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
