SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
THR33SIX8,
Plaintiff,
v.
CYERMAZIKEEN; VALKYTZ;
HUXDOWNLOAD,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-4515
DEFENDANT ’ S M OTION TO DISMISS
Defendants, proceeding by and through the Solicitor General of Ridgeway, respectfully move
this Court to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(5). Attached hereto is a
memorandum of law supporting dismissal.
Dated: July 4, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
Lander, Mayflower
/s/ BrendaPopplewell
BrendaPopplewell
Solicitor General
EffortlessBrit
Deputy Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
THR33SIX8,
Plaintiff,
v.
CYERMAZIKEEN; VALKYTZ;
HUXDOWNLOAD,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-4515
DEFENDANT ’ S M OTION TO DISMISS
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
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FACTUAL B ACKGROUND
On June 30, 2025, Defendants CyerMazikeen, Valktyz, and HuxDownload—duly sworn
peace officers in the State of Ridgeway—were patrolling the port near Sterling notorious for the
illegal firearms market in one of the cargo containers on the port. 1 Defendants spotted Plaintiff’s
black Cavela near the firearms dealer right as he was in the process of purchasing firearms and
placing them in the trunk of his vehicle. When Plaintiff spotted Defendants on his way out from
the firearms dealer, he equipped a firearm and fired multiple shots wounding Valkytz.
At some point during this exchange of gunfire, Plaintiff was tazed by Huxdownload and
detained. While handcuffed in the back of Defendants’ vehicle, Valktyz performed a search of
Plaintiff’s vehicle and seized illegal ammunition and firearms which Thr33six8 had previously
purchased from the illegal firearms dealer. Plaintiff was trespassing, purchasing illegal contraband,
and was caught red-handed by Defendants. Now Plaintiff brings this harassing and frivolous
lawsuit against Defendants seeking damages and injunctive relief. That is untenable.
Because Defendants had probable cause to search Plaintiff’s vehicle and did not violate clearly
established law, the Court should entitle Defendants to qualified immunity and dismiss the claims
for money damages. Moreover, Defendant’s claim for injunctive relief suffers from a standing and
redressability deficiency (and is improperly pled as a claim against CyerMazikeen); the Court
should dismiss this de-facto claim against the Government for lack of standing.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pleadings must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” See Rid. R. Civ. P. (Title III, Rule 8). Defendants may object to the factual
1 Law enforcement rouninely patrol this area to ensure individuals are not illegally purchasing
weapons from the firearms dealer.
2
form of such allegations. Id. at 12(a)(5). To survive a motion to dismiss under 12(a)(5), a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted to be true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). A claim only has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to
draw a reasonable inference that defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ibid.
ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief.
The injunction is an extraordinary remedy; and not surprisingly so. From the early days of
our Republic, courts of equity only exercised their powers where legal remedies were inadequate
and irreparable injury was imminent. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (“[C]ourts of
equity should not act * * * when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not
suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.”) See Story, Commentaries on Equity
Jurisprudence §959a, at 227 (“[Injunctive relief] ought . . . to be guarded with extreme caution,
and applied only in very clear cases”). As such, a person seeking injunctive relief must face “a real
and immediate threat of repeated injury.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974); Murthy
v. Missouri, 603 U.S. ___ (2024) (slip op. at 11) (“[B]ecause the plaintiffs request forward-look-
ing relief, they must face a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting O’Shea, slip op. at 11). See also Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S.
149, 158 (2014) (“An allegation of future injury * * * suffice[s] if the threatened injury is certainly
impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur”)
This case scarcely fits that bill. Plaintiff alleges that the trunk of his vehicle was unlawfully
searched by Defendants incident to a lawful arrest. To that end, he seeks an “injunction * * *
requiring that the [Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office] dishonorably discharge Valktyz and
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Huxdownload from the RCSO and the [Law Enforcement Training Institute] investigate
CyerMazikeen for his inaction toward the search * * *”. Pl’s Comp. at ¶ 1.a. Plaintiff’s Complaint
suffers from two fatal deficiencies: (1) he has not alleged a real and immediate threat of future
irreparable harm; and (2) even if he had, the injunction sought would serve to punish Defendants
rather than to “redress[]” the anticipated injury. Murthy, at 1981 (“To establish standing, the
plaintiffs must demonstrate a substantial risk that, in the near future, they will suffer an injury that
is traceable to a Government defendant and redressable by the injunction they seek.”). See also
Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183-184 (1968) (“[Injunctions]
* * * must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective
permitted by constitutional mandate and the needs of the public order.”)
Because Plaintiff fails to allege that he will face “a real and immediate threat of irreparable
injury,” O’Shea, at 496, and because such an injury would not be “redressable” by the punitive and
harassing injunction sought, Murthy, at 1981, Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief
II. Plaintiff’s Section 3201 Claim Against CyerMazikeen is Improperly Pled.
Plaintiff’s Complaint sues Defendant CyerMazikeen under 1 R. Stat. § 3201 for “$1,000.00
in punitive damages.” Pl’s. Comp. at ¶ 1.a. But Section 3201 only authorizes suits for “[injunctive]
order[s] against the government.” Id. Section 3201 neither applies to individuals—such as
CyerMazikeen—nor authorizes punitive damages against individuals. Moreover, Section 3201
requires the existence of an “[illegal] policy, order, procedure, or directive.” Id. This language is
analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, when properly applied to Government agencies, permits suit
only where an agency acts pursuant to a policy “adopted or promulgated by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S.
658, 659 (1978). As Plaintiff improperly brings his claim against CyerMazikeen instead of the
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Government, and fails to identify an “official policy [or procedure/directive]” as the “moving
force” behind the alleged violations, Id., at 658, he fails to state a claim under Section 3201.
III. Plaintiff’s Section 3114 Claim is Barred by Qualified Immunity.
Qualified immunity protects government officials from “liability for civil damages * * *
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
Courts resolving questions of qualified immunity are required to resolve a “threshold question:
Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry.” Saucier v. Katz,
533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were
violated, “the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established * * * in light
of the specific context of the case.” Ibid. Plaintiff’s Complaint sues CyerMazikeen, Valkytz, and
Huxdownload pursuant to 1 R. Stat. § 3114. As Plaintiff seeks punitive damages, Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity unless they violated a clearly established right.
No such showing has been made here. Plaintiff’s vehicle was searched after Defendants
caught Plaintiff red-handed fleeing an illegal firearms transaction and after Plaintiff opened fire
when Defendants approached his vehicle. These facts alone constitute probable cause not only to
arrest but also to search the vehicle he used to store the illegal contraband. See Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (officers may search a vehicle incident to arrest when it is “reasonable
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle”); United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (“[A] lawful search of an automobile extends to every part of the
vehicle where contraband may be concealed.”). Thus, the “threshold question” of qualified
immunity—whether Plaintiff’s rights were violated—is easily answered in the negative. The Court
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needs not next decide the thorny problem of whether Plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights
were clearly established; indeed, Defendants did not violate his rights at all.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the Complaint and entitle Defendants
to qualified immunity.
Dated: July 4, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
Lander, Mayflower
/s/ BrendaPopplewell
BrendaPopplewell
Solicitor General
EffortlessBrit
Deputy Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
